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Foreword 
The main focus of the "Poverty Dynamics" project of our Special Research Centre 186 
"Status Passages and Risks in the Life Course" has been the analysis of the temporal 
dimension of poverty, especially the dependency on Social Assistance. At first two co horts 
(1983-1989, 1989-1994) of first-time claimants of Basic Income Support (Hilfe zum 
Lebensunterhalt) in the municipality of Bremen, a major city in the Northwest of Germany, 
were analysed and compared, looking at a six year "window" each. After unification the 
patterns and Social Assistance trajectories found in Bremen were compared with those in 
Halle/Saale, a city in the formerly communist part of Germany, in the early 1990s. 
Since 1997 this comparative perspective has been broadened to international comparisons. 
First Petra Buhr published a comparison of Germany with Sweden (Sfb working paper 51/98; 
Leviathan 1999,27, 2: 218-237). Also published was a comparison of Germany with Italy by 
Wolfgang Voges and Yuri Kazepov (Sfb working paper 52/98). The present, third working 
paper in this series contrasts Social Assistance dynamics in Germany and the U.S.A. A fourth 
study of Lutz Leisering and Robert Walker will contrast Germany with the U.K. In a final 
phase of the Special Research Centre, in the years 2000 and 2001, the project hopes to 
continue its international comparisons: Now the comparative effort would be extended to 
welfare administration in some of these countries - and could be characterized by the heading 
''from active client to activating administration". 
Ralf Bohrhardt and Stephan Leibfried show in this working paper how different poverty 
policies influence the risk, the duration, and the dynamics of Social Assistance receipt by 
families. They compare the performance of means-tested income support policies addressed to 
families with children in Germany and the U.S.A. They rely on two sets of longitudinal 
administrative data for each country. The somewhat counter-intuitive results may be 
summarized as follows: In the U.S. lone or unemployed parents who did not leave Social 
Assistance in their first year 01 receipt stay on the rolls longer and more continuously than 
they do in Germany's more generous welfare state. Some selection effects are analyzed to 
account for these differences. Time related multi-variate analysis shows significant regional 
disparities in both countries. It also points to the importance of social stratification and labor 
market characteristics for the found differences. 
A synthesis of one decade of research on "Poverty Dynamics" is now available in Lutz 
Leisering and Stephan Leibfried, Time and Poverty in Western Welfare States. United 
Germany in Perspective, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999. Another string of the 
Bremen Sfb work, here focusing on risks at labor-market entry, is accessible through the same 
press: Walter R. Heinz, ed., From Education to Work. Cross-National Perspectives, 1999. 
Bremen, August 1999 
Walter R. Heinz 
Chair, Special Research Centre 186 
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Introduction 
The economic well-being of families with children has declined in most 
Western societies over the past decades. Their relative economic status is 
increasingly affected by major changes in our most fundamental institutions: 
gender relations, the global economy in conjunction with national labor 
markets, and the welfare state (CORNIAIDANZINGER 1997). 
Changes in family related values and orientations have had two conse-
quences. First, they have led to a polarization among households including 
adults in the labor force: Singles or - more often - couples without children 
are usually better educated, hold the better paying jobs, and are more likely 
to be upwardly mobile in their careers than families with one or - more 
often - more children. The model of a single male breadwinner did not work 
any longer and it has become nessesary in most two parent families that both 
parents work to ensure a sufficient family income. Furthermore, real wages 
of low skilIed young adults have declined continuously over recent decades 
in the United States.1n Europe real wages have increased, if at all, only very 
slowly but unemployment rates have risen particularly in that group 
(NICKELUBELL 1996; NICKELL 1998). Both tendencies, the polarization of 
households and falling real wages for the less qualified contribute to the 
currently high levels of relative economic deprivation among families with 
children. Secondly, diminishing family ties 'increased the share of children 
who live with a single parent. In these families the parent is most often 
unable to obtain adequately paid work because of child care responsibilities. 
Welfare policies protect individuals or families from economic depriva-
tion during a wage loss for which the earner is not held responsible. Differ-
ent nations have pursued different paths to attain this goal. One might 
assume that national differences in poverty rates can be explained by the 
different role of government policies and the different welfare systems in 
place. Indeed, comparative studies have shown that the poverty rates of 
families do differ considerably among Western industrialized countries de-
pending on the national standards of monetary transfers and social service 
provisions (RAINWATER 1995). But how do these policies influence the 
poverty dynamics of families? Or - focused on the relative efficiency of 
different welfare policies - how do these welfare systems affect the temporal 
patterns of welfare receipt by families ? The answers to these questions are 
basically unknown. Our study focuses on these questions. 
Generally three distinct types of welfare states are distinguished accord-
ing to the degree of 'decommodification', that is according to differences in 
the ease with which an average person can leave the labor market and with-
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draw his or her labor power. In his pioneering work "The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism" ESPING-ANDERSEN (1990) classified most OECD coun-
tries according to three ideal-types: I 
• the social-democratic model, with a strong role of state intervention, 
universalistic social policies and a high level of decommodification; 
• the conservative model, with a strong role of contribution-based social 
insurance, only residual tax-based security pro grams , and a medium 
level of decommodification; and 
• the liberal model, with a strong market orientation, selective social poli-
eies and a low level of decommodification. 
We will compare the dynamics of dependency in income support programs 
for families with children in two countries: Germany, which is often de-
picted as the typical conservative model of a welfare state, and the V.S., 
which is the most pronounced version of the liberal model. 2 
These two countries were chosen for different reasons. 'Globalization' is 
often seen as limiting, liberalizing, and 'recommodifying' social policy in 
Europe. Thus, we should focus on the specific qualities, outcomes and the 
effieiency of programs addressed to families with children hi a European 
welfare state which is challenged by liberalisatio~ and compare it with the 
already liberal USA. This should reveal the different balance struck between 
costs and benefits in the continental European welf are state and in the liberal 
model. But on which of the two European models should we center our 
analysis? We focus on the conservative model of a European welfare state 
since the efficiency of anti-poverty policies in the social-democratic model-
as represented most typically by Sweden - has already been shown else-
where not to differ substantially from the conservative model (BUHR 1998, 
1999). For the latter we concentrate on Germany, as it is usually considered 
most typical for that model. 
1 These types correspond to different strategies modern welfare states have chosen to deal 
with unemployment: expanding what is known as the 'social service state' (e.g. Sweden), 
encouraging exit from the labor market via disability and early retirement policies in the 
'social insurance state' (e.g. Germany) or low wage work in the private service sector in 
what used to be called the residual 'social assistance state' (e.g. USA) but has, after the 
1996 reform (see GEBHARDT 1998, GEBHARD/JACOBS 1997), moved doser to the 'poor 
law state'. SCHARPF (1999) focuses on the (un)employment issue and develops these 
contrasts systematically. EARDLEY et al. (1996a) develop a comparative typology focused 
on the institutional side of social assistance only. In contrast, GOODIN et al. (1999) try to 
provide a different empirical foundation to ESPING-ANDERSON'S ideal types for wh oIe 
welfare states, while ALLMENDINGER and HINZ (1998) attempt to do so for life courses. 
2 For a further comparison of German Social Assistance with a less pronounced version of 
the liberal model, the U.K., see LEISERINGIWALKER (1999). 
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Our study begins with abrief overview of the institutional systems and 
settings of anti-poverty policies in Germany and the Vnited States. Regional 
differences are significant, especially in the V.S. Thus, we have to focus on 
the local level: We chose two German cities and two metropolitan counties 
in CaIifomia for our comparison - four locations for which reliable and 
comparable sets of longitudinal administrative data were at hand. We 
proceed to discuss the data, the sampie, and the methods applied. We 
describe differences in the duration of welfare speIls and analyze which 
explanatory variables might be relevant. The results are discussed with 
respeet to differences in the labor rriarket, the demographie strueture, and the 
eharacteristics of the different welfare programs. Finally, some conclusions 
are drawn for further sociaI poHey development. 
Institutional Differences3 
There are several major differences between the publie efforts to institution-
alize minimum income maintainan~e in Germany a~d the V.S. The most 
fundamental differences in these anti-poverty systems He in the eligibility 
meehanisms. 
Germany is charaeterized by a tendeney to universal eligibility for wel-
fare benefits in the sense that universal rights are granted equally to all 'the 
poor': its eonservative welfare state basically reHes on one broad-based cash 
assistance program (Soeial Assistanee) giving every person in need -
whether single parent, working poor, elderly or not - the same right to 
welfare. Social Assistanee in Germany is cast quite universally, which fore-
stalls a routine trajectory of focusing on ever smaller (sub)eategories and 
thus linking support to past behavior or to behavioral change.4 
3 For a more exhaustive description of the institutional embeddedness of fighting poverty 
see EARDLEY et al. (1996: 159-177, 418-439), LEIBFRIED (1979), GEBHARDT (1999), 
GEBHARDT/JACOBS (1997) and HANESCH (1997). For more data driven nation-wide 
poverty comparisons cf. BÜCHEL et al. (1999) and KRAUSE (1999); for the U.S. cf. the 
Green Book of the U.S. House of Representatives' Committee on Ways and Means in its 
different versions of the 1990s (in German language the summary of MURSWIECK, 1998). 
For a general comparative framework see LEISERINGILEIBFRIED (1999: 47-53). 
4 The program structure cannot prevent general prejudices or even political campaigns 
against (subgroups ot) c1aimants of Social Assistance in Germany. But such campaigns 
are buffered by the structure of Social Assistance: Sensitive subgroups like single par-
ents, those able to work etc. are not routinely displayed as support categories, and they 
are not entitled or administrated separately. Until now only asylum seekers have been cut 
out of general Social Assistance in 1993 and were shelved to a special categorical 
program (with lower benefits and more in-kind transfers) - the first major break with 
Germany's broad-based cash assistance approach. 
8 
By contrast, the V.S. practices a strong categorical approach: Different 
programs are targeted at certain well-defined subgroups of the poor only, 
like lone parents, the working poor, and the aged. According to V.S. analys-
ts like Rebecca BLANK (1997: 89-91, 232-234) this system is not character-
ized by "broad-based" cash assistance which is structurally less dicrimina-
ting. Rather, transfer programs are tied to what is seen as distinct past 
"behavior" - like having become a single parent or having joined the 
working poor. In addition or altem atively , programs are meant to change 
specific behaviors - such as job training aimed exclusively at particular 
groups of the poor, or policies discouraging having further children while on 
welfare. 
This contrast between "behavioral" (categorical) and "broad-based" (uni-
versal) Social Assistance schemes is not meant to be a pure one: Germany's 
quite universal scheme also has behavioral elements, e.g. for unemployed 
claimants, and the V.S. has some categorical components which are cast 
more universally and less behaviorally targeted than others, for example its 
F ood Stamps program. 
The different locus of Social Assistance schemes in Germany and the 
U.S.-can oe grasped - for the early 90s, the time period of our empirical ana-
lysis - from the data in Table 1 (see below). While Social Assistance 
schemes in Germany - including means-tested benefits in Vnemployment 
Insurance and Housing Assistance - cost about one tenth of all Social 
Security expenditures, in the V.S. they amounted to one third of all Social 
Security outlays. The GDP slice used for Social Assistance schemes in Ger-
many is 2 percent vis-a-vis 3.7 percent in the V.S. In Germany 1 out of 20 
persons depends on Social Assistance programs, in the V.S. this is true for 1 
out of 10. Social Assistance in Germany, though not as small as it had be-
come in the 1960s, still remains somewhat marginal in Germany's Sozial-
staat, itls 'social state'. Welfare in the V.S., in contrast, has been a major 
policy pillar of its 'welfare t state for the last decades.5 
5 Differences in Social Assistance landscapes also reflect in the divergent status of 
'poverty Iines' in Germany and the U.S.: Since Social Assistance in Germany rests on a 
universal right to welfare, its standards are used at the same time as a statistical measure 
for a diagnosis of the social poverty landscape. Thus, an independent national poverty 
standard never delevoped (and some academic standards tied to average incomes 
flourished in its stead). In contrast, Social Assistance schemes in the U.S. are so 
divergent and particular, that a universal and common poverty line could hardly flow 
from them. Rather, a poverty line had to be developed quite independently for social 
reporting in the 1960s (when federal poverty programs had barely developed anyhow). 
Table 1: Basic Figures on Social Assistance Schemes in Germany 
and the D.S., 1992 
Total expediture of Social Assistance 
schemes as a percentage of the Gross 
Domestic Product 
Cash assistanci 
Housing assistanci 
Other tied assistanci 
Total expediture of Social Assistance 
schemes as a percentage of social 
• 4 protectlon 
Total expediture of Social Assistance 
schemes as a percentage of social securityS 
Individuals in families c1aiming benefits 
of Social Assistance schemes as a percen-
tage of the total national population 
. Cash assistance l 
Housing assistance2 
Other tied assistance3 
Notes: 
Germany U.S. 
2.0 
0.9 
0.2 
0.9 
7.6 
11.8 
5.2 
2.8 
'2.3 
3.7 
1.3 
0.3 
2.1 
18.9 
32.8 
10.0 
2.2 
11.2 
I For Gerrnany: HLu, Arbeitslosenhilfe; for the O.S.: Food Stamps, General 
Assistance, AFDC, Supplemental Security Incorne; Veterans' Pension; Earn-
ed Income Tax Credit. 
2 Excluding those assistance programs integrated into other assistance 
schemes; for Gerrnany: Wohngeld; for the O.S.: Federal Housing Assistance; 
Low Income Horne Energy Assistance. 
3 For Germany: HbL; for the U.S.: Medicaid; School Lunch and Breakfast 
program; Special Supplementary Food Program, Job Training Partnership 
Act, Head Start. 
4Including an public social spending in cash and in kind, excluding educa-
tion, but including health; OECD data for 1990/91. 
s Including all government social security and welfare transfers to house-
holds; OECD data for 1990/91. 
Source: OECD, EARDLEY et a1. 1996. 
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Gennany 
In Germany any citizen or legal resident has a constitutional right to live in 
human dignity. Social Assistance (Sozialhilfe) was instituted to ensure that 
anybody in need can live adecent life.6 Assistance is not organized as 
charity but as astriet entitlement, enforced by the Administrative Court 
System. Any citizen or legal resident who does not cross the 'poverty 
threshold' defined by the states (Länder) is eligible for Social Assistance 
benefits under German law.7 Today this threshold ranges on average - de-
pending on region and household size - between 980 DM for a single person 
in East Germany and 2500 DM for a single parent family with two children 
in West Germany. Assistance was and is granted without time limits; thus, 
in individual cases the program delivers pension-like benefits, though in 
general it is to help claimants regain their independence ('Help to Self-
Help') in the short and middle run. 
The pro gram is means-tested, in income and assets. It is administered by 
local authorities with direct funding provided almost entirely by the munici-
palities (80%), some by the states, (19%) and - at first. glance "":- with almost 
no funding by the federal government (1 %).8 Social Assistance benefits are 
subordinated ,to almost all other incomes or transfers, be they private or 
public. 
There are at least two major tax-financed programs wbich strongly im-
pact on Social Assistance and its costs: Germany has non-means tested 
federal Child Benefits for every child up to the age of 18.9 Child Benefits do 
6 Social Assistance replaced the older Fürsorge in 1962; for the historical development see 
LEISERINGILEIBFRIED (1999: 175-199). 
7 EU citizens who work in Germany are entitled to benefits for up to six months after they 
loose their job; then they have to leave the country. Since 1993 asylum seekers receive 
benefits according to a similar though less generous program (cf. fn.3; on the interaction 
of the different types of immigrants in Germany with Social Assistance see LEISERINGI 
LEIBFRIED 1999: 68f.). Students are not entitled to Basic Support under Social Assistance 
though they may satisfy the income threshold for eligibility. They were given a mostly 
adequate separate entitlement scheme instead. 
8 Federal public finance in Germany rests on a quite developed system of vertical and hori-
zontal revenue sharing which reaches all the way down to the Iocal level. This stands in 
stark contrast to U.S.-federalism and its principle of "every tub on its own bottom". This 
explains why regional differences in the German welfare system are limited while they 
are massive in the U.S. (cf. DITCH et al. 1997). It also explains the different pressures 
exerted on welfare systems: the pressure in Germany - because of its 'marble cake' 
federaJism (LEIBFRIED/ PIERSON 1995: 17) - is also to homogenize the systems while and 
in the U.S. - because of its 'layer cake' federalism (ibid.) - the pressures to fragment 
welfare systems (devolution) dominate. 
9 Actually it is possible for a family to choose between standardized Child Benefits and a 
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not cover total standardized child costs - a standard German critique of 
Child Benefits. 1O Nor does Social Assistance, but it is rnuch closer to total 
coverage. ll As a result, the costs of children are not cornpensated equally for 
all families, especially not for the bottorn third of the 'income pyramid ' and 
claimants of Social Assistance. Thus, a 'child-cost wedge' is driven between 
the 'working poor' and the 'welfare poor'. This wedge feeds permanent 
conflicts, especially over stressing and enforcing the legal principle that 
Social Assistance Benefits have to be significantly lower than the average 
income of farnilies with a parent working in the low-income sector. The 
second important tax -financed federal scheme is incorne-tested general 
Housing Assistance (Wohngeld). It covers the costs of housing and heating 
up to a certain level. 12 Both of these 'sectoral' programs aim also at some 
segments of the middle dass. Thus, these programs are more universal than 
Social Assistance and even less prone to 'behavioral' linkage. 
Social Assistance is also subordinated to all forms of social security 
transfers. German social security strongly conforms to a corporatist, Bis-
:rnarckian model of obligatory social insurance·which is·based ön ,individual 
contributions. In case of unemployrnent, illness, disability or old age, earn-
ings are replaced, through these systems with benefits closely tied to pre-
vious earnings. 13 Social Assistance works as 'a safety net of last resort' : 
tax reduction of a certain amount for each child. If the child is unemployed Child Bene-
fit is paid up to the age of 21, in case of full-time education up to the age of 27. There 
are no age-limits for Child Benefit, if the child is disabled. 
10 This critique is only possible in Germany: The German Federal Constitutional Court 
sees a constitutional mandate for more complete cost coverage and has decided accord-
ingly in the last decade to force areform of the income tax system. In the U.S. child 
costs are seen as a totaUy private issue, they are not picked up anywhere outside AFDC/ 
TANF. 
11 ChiId Benefit is 250 DM for the first and the second child, 300 DM for the third, and 
350 DM for each additional child under 18 (see previous footnote) regardless of their 
present age. Those Benefits are raised by Social Assistance to 270 DM for each child up 
to age 7 (respectively to 300 DM if the child in this age group lives in a single parent 
family), to 350 DM for children age 7-13, and to 490 DM for children age 14-17 (scale 
rates for Bremen state, 1999). 
12 Coverage depends on household size, age and condition of the building, and average 
rent level in a particular region. 
13 After one year of first tier Unemployment Benefits (Arbeitslosengeld) at 60% of net 
wages (67% for families with at least one child), benefits are reduced to 53% (57% for 
families) in Unemployment Assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe). This second tier benefit is not 
as strictly means-tested as Social Assistance but also tax-financed and basicly without 
time limits. It has always functioned as a special super-welf are scheme for the unem-
ployed and is, if necessary, supplemented by Social Assistance benefits. 
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People are caught in this net when other social security institutions do not 
lift them at least to the minimum threshold. 
Social Assistance takes various forms: cash, in-kind benefits, and ser-
vices. It provides Basic Income Support (Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt, HLu) 
and Special Needs Support, for example in disability , illness, or through old-
age care (Hilfe in besonderen Lebenslagen, HbL). The Special Needs ele-
ment of Assistance to the Sick (Krankenhilfe ) extends contributory German 
Health Insurance - which reaches nearly all members of the population - to 
all welfare claimants. Assistance to the Sick is tax-financed by the local 
govemment and entitles to the same level of treatment as granted in General 
Health Insurance. There is no health care gap between the welfare poor, the 
working poor, and other social groups that might function as a 'poverty trap' 
- quite in contrast to the D.S. 
Assistance to help offset living expenses covers food, clothing, toiletries, 
household goods, heating, and everyday necessities. Reasonable housing 
costs are covered completely. Reasonable expenses for participating in 
soclal'änd cultüral events are also covered,; 'In addition to recurrent standar-
dized payments, special one-time benefits are granted on application to ob-
"tain more costly iterns such as special clothing (e.g., coats), major household 
goods (like a washing machine) or heating material in winter. 
Scale rates vary only marginally between states or municipalities. Due to 
annual adjustments the level of benefits remain rather close to 40% of aver-
age national income, moving towards 60% as the household grows in size. 
In 1995 average income for a single person was about 1870 DM in the West 
and 1 646 DM (with purchasing power adjusted) in the East German states 
(HABICH/KRAUSE 1997: 517). Dntil 1998 the special Allowance for Earned 
Income, addressed to the 'working poor' on Social Assistance, was ab out 
265 DM per month and household. This allowance increased slightly 
according to a new, rather complex formula (see SELL 1998). In general the 
benefits granted are, compared with low-income families, sufficient to live a 
decent life. 
United States 
In the D.S. not everybody has a right to a minimum income just because of 
citizenship or legal residency. Diverse programs serve the poor, many of 
them targeted at narrow groups of people or narrow needs. These programs 
are entangled in a pervasive moralistic discourse which cherishes 'social 
security' benefits as 'eamed' and 'deserving' - and which stigmatizes tax-
financed 'welfare' as mostly 'undeserving'. But social security does not 
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cover much of the low-wage economy and the secondary labor market 
remains unprotected. Also, the D.S. lacks a comprehensive national system 
of health insurance that covers the 'working poor'; only the 'welfare poor' 
(Medicaid) and the aged (Medicare) are protected. All attempts at univer-
salization have failed (cf. HACKER 1997). 
Families with children are a target group but only if one parent is absent 
(single parent household) or unemployed. Until 1996 the relevant pro gram 
was Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). In 1996 Temporary 
Aidfor Needy Families (TANFJl4 replaced AFDC - as legislated in the Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996. This 
new legislation brought massive changes: The federal stmcture of welf are 
policy making was affected by new mIes for financing and by granting the 
states more flexibility to manage welfare (block grants). Welfare delivery to 
the poor was affected through time-limits (maximum of two years of contin-
uous receipt, not more than five years during a life time, though excepting 
20 percent of the caseload), tougher work enforcement pro grams and sanc-
. tions formothers' 'who continued to give birth to children on welfare (see 
also TELES 1998: 164-187).15 
,The AFDC· program was state-administered, federally regulated and joint-
ly funded. It included automatic eligibility for F ood Stamps, booklets of 
coupons which .can be exchanged at certain stores for food only. Also, 
AFDC recipients automatically qualified for free medical assistance under 
Medicaid (for Califomia cf. SPARER 1996). AFDC was awarded to children 
under 18 who were deprived of parental care and support due to death, in-
capacity or continued absence of a parent or due to unemployment (working 
less than 100 hours a month) of a parent who was the principal earner. Un-
less exempted all able-bodied adults had to register for the Job Opportuni-
ties and Basic Skills Training Program (JOBS).16 
Payment levels vary widely between states. In 199721 states had a 'com-
bined payment standard' lower than the their 'need standard' - an inconsis-
tency based on a long line of precedents (see LEIBFRIED 1981; USR&E 
14 The acronym TANF was changed to CalWORKs in California. 
15 Seen from different angles the real employment effect of such 'pushe strategies is quite 
dubious (cf. AscILoPREST 1999; LEETFlBANIA 1999; DANZINGER et al. 1999). 
16 Social Assistance programs in California are administered at the county level with major 
funding and administrative oversight from the California Department of Sodal Services 
(CDSS) in Sacramento. The Medicaid program in California is called Medi-Cal, the 
California equivalent for JOBS is GAIN (Greater Avenuesfor lndependence). AFDC and 
GAIN operated as separate programs, were administered in different locations, and 
worked with non-compatible computer systems. 
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1980). Table 2 lists the benefit payments for Mississippi, the state with the 
lowest levels, Alaska, the state with the highest levels, and California, the 
state in which the two counties of our study are located. Payments were re-
duced by the applicant' s income, except for a disregard of 90 $ and one third 
of each additional dollar earned plus a disregard of 175 $ for child care ex-
penses. 
Table 2: Need Standards and Maximum AFDCrrANF and Food Stamps Benefits, 
One-Parent Family ofThree Persons, January 1997 
Mississippi Califomia Alaska Mediai1a 
Poverty thresholdb 1,111 $ 1,111$ 1,389 $ 
Need standard 368 735 1,057 
Maximum AFDcrr ANF grant 120 565 923 
as percent 01 poverty threshold 11 51 66 
Food Stamp benefit 315 261 323 
Combined benefit 435 826 1,246 
as percent,olpoverty threshold 39 74 90 
Notes: a Ranked by maximum benefit. b Amount of money required to purchase the lowest 
cost 'nutritionally adequate' diet for a household of three persons, multiplied by three to 
cover additional costs like housing. 
Source: Committee ofWays and Means (1998: 416-418). 
1t is generally agreed most AFDCffANF claimants cannot possibly survive 
on such a low level of benefits. Thus, this system of 'provision' almost 
presupposes that claimants work to some extent in the informal economy, 
particularly as domestic servants (housekeeping and child care), without re-
porting income to welfare or tax authorities. Fraudulent compensation might 
also include claiming welfare for identical children in several families or 
claiming payments in several cities or states - which is easier in the U.S. 
compared with Germany, due to differences in residency registration and in 
the ease of changing names. 
There are two pro grams which impact on welfare benefits: the major one 
is the Earned Income Tax Credit aimed at the 'working poor', in which the 
federal tax authorities raise low family income up to a certain amount on an 
annual basis (see institutionally: HOWARD 1998: 139-160; MYLESIPIERSON 
1997; on welfare impacts: MEYERIROSENBAUM 1998; BLANK et al. 1999). 
Apart from that there are general state or local Housing Assistance schemes. 
Most states offer a Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program to help 
I 
t 
i 
L 
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coping with bills for heating and air-conditioning and with installing low-
cost weather-proofing. These programs allow for considerable administra-
tive discretion. 
Data and Methods 
Due to the different scope of welfare regulation in Germany and the Vnited 
States our analysis is restricted to two groups of families which both sys-
tems equally address: lone parents or couples with children and an unem-
ployed parent. 
Even though the replacement of AFDC by TANF in the V.S. can surely 
be considered one of the most interesting and radical policy changes in the 
1990s, we still have to rely on pre-T ANF data for longitudinal analyses. 
Time since the implementation of the 1996 reform is too short to already 
have data with a wide enough observation window for a sensible longitudi-
nal analysis. Also, post-TANF data would cause serious problems in co m-
paring . the durations of claiming Social Assistance since we would have 
legally enforced time limits in the U.S. but not in Germany. Thus, our 
. analysis concentrates in both countries on Social Assistance claimants who 
were (USA) or would have been (Germany) eligible for benefits under the 
scope of the former AFDC program. 
As outlined above, Social Assistance regulations vary significantly in the 
U.S. among the different states. For this reason we want to compare two 
cities in Germany with two cities (urban counties) in the United States of 
America and not whole nations. I7 
Our German data are administrative Social Assistance data from the De-
partments of Social Services of Bremen, a major city in the North-West of 
Germany, and of Halle an der Saale, a city in the Eastern, formerly commu-
nist part of unified Germany. The data are part of the Bremen and Halle 
10%-Longitudinal-Samples of Social Assistance Files (LSA) and were 
drawn from the administrative records by the Special Research Centre 186 
and the Centre for Social Policy Research at the University of Bremen under 
the direction of STEPHAN LEIBFRIED (Bremen) and THOMAS ÜLK (Halle/ 
Saale). 
17 DUNCAN & VOGES (1993) were the first, and so far the only ones, who tried a similar 
comparison, though with a nation wide sampIe of the Panel Study o/Income Dynamics 
(PSID). A broader study was done by DUNCAN et aI. (1995) for eight countries. Here cit-
ies were compared with countries or even with half of the North-American continent, 
measures of income poverty in some countries with Social Assistance dependency in 
others. 
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For Bremen the data consist of a 10 percent random sampIe of persons, 
who successfully applied for Basic Income Support (Hilfe zum Lebensunter-
halt) for the first time in 198918 and were belonging either to a single parent 
family or a family with an unemployed parent. These persons were observed 
until September, 1994. For Halle an der Saale we rely on a 10 percent ran-
dom sampie of single parent families cr families with an unemployed parent, 
who received Basic Income Support in 1991 for the first time.18 - After 
German unification on October 3, 1990 the West German Social Assistance 
Act (BundessozialhiLJegesetz) became effective in East Germany on J anuary 
1, 1991. The social welfare system of the GDR was of a different character 
and catered only to some 5000 people (see LEISERINGILEffiFRIED 1999: 200-
223). - Persons in this sampie were followed until October 1995. 
For Califomia we rely on AFDC claimants from two urban counties: Ala-
meda County, which is part of the greater San Francisco Bay Area, and Los 
Angeles County in Southern Califomia. Here we look at households wh ich 
entered AFDC irt 1992 for the first time. 18 T~ey are part of a representative 
point-in-time sampIe of AFDC claimants drawn by the California Work 
Pays D~monst~ation Project (CWPDP).19 Approximately 20 percent of all 
families selected' for the CWPDP sampie pan:icipated in at least one wave of 
a telephone-survey, wh ich is the major source for all covariates. Only the 
assistance history variables are drawn from administrative data in the county 
registers (for further details see Appendix).20 As families with an unem-
ployed parent were oversampled in the survey we downweighted them in the 
descriptive statistics with a factor of .02 for Alameda County and .03 for Los 
Angeles County to readjust these families to their original share of 6 to 7 
percent of the overall Social Assistance caseload in 1992. Sampling month 
for the CWPDP was October 1992, but only those c1aimants were kept in 
the sampIe, who were still on the rolls in December 1992, the month in 
which the original 'Work Pays Demonstration' began. The assistance history 
of all these cases can be observed until September 1996. 
Any stock sampie of Social Assistance claimants is biased towards the 
experience of 'stayers' in the system. If we look at all households claiming 
18 We know at least, that these persons did not hand in any applications in the five prece-
ding years. 
19 The project consists of a scientific evaluation of a welfare reform package approved by a 
federal waiver of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on March 1, 1994 
(cf. BECERRA et al. 1996). 
20 The actual data were taken from the CWPDP Public Use File Versions 2.0/2.1 as of 
January 1997. Cases with apparently inconsistent data from the Assistance History and 
the Four County Case Files have been excluded. 
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Social Assistance at a certain point in time (cross-section) and select those 
households who claimed this kind of support for the first time within the 
preceding year (annual entry cohort), we do not have all claimants of that 
entry cohohrt in our sampie: Only those cases are included which entered 
Social Assistance within the specified year and have continued receipt at 
least until the (final) sampling month (let us say December 1992 as in the 
CWPDP). Thus, we do not have those households in our sampie who enter-
ed Social Assistance in the specified year but left the rolls again before the 
point-in-time sampie was (finally) drawn (here in December 1992; see upper 
part of Figure 1). On the other hand we do have all claimants of that entry 
cohort in our cross-sectional D.S. sampie who stayed at least for one year on 
the rolls (see lower part of Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Missing Cases of an Social Assistance Entry Cohort in the CWPDP 
Cross-Sectional SampIe 
----------------1 
._--------------~ 
1------------------------------------------------
J F M A M J JAS 0 N D J F M 
= claimants lost by sampling method 
= claimants picked up by sampling method 
Thus, to extract a comparable entry cohort from the longitudinal LSA sam-
pIe and the cross-sectional CWPDP sampie we had to exclude all cases from 
both databases that did not claim Social Assistance for at least one year. 
Otherwise German data would be - compared to the California data - artifi-
cially biased in favor of short stayers as they are picked up completely in the 
LSA but - due to the different sampling procedure - very rarely in the 
CWPDP. Thus, we will look only at families with children, who became 
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eligible for Social Assistance for the first time in a certain year and who 
stayed on the ro11s for at least one year after their initial entry. 
As the CWPDP was an evaluation of an experiment made possible by a 
federal waiver21 there are experimental cases for which legislation has been 
changed (the AFDC grant was reduced and work incentives were raised) and 
control cases for whom the old legislation obtained. Our cases come from 
both groups since the patterns of receipt in the two counties were found to 
be essentially similar in prior research (BECERRA et al. 1996). 
With the 'AFDC selection bias' we have 61 sampie cases from the Bre-
men LSA, 39 from the Halle LSA, and 251 (78 weighted) from the CWPDP 
files, of which 64 (14) cases are from Alameda County and 187 (64) from 
Los Angeles County. Taking those together the total number of cases in both 
countries amounts to 351 (178) households. 
Individual level information is given for the "head of household" as de-
fined and processed by the Bremen administration. This is the mother in 
case of a solo female parent and the male partner in the case of married or 
cohabiting couples. 
~ince the observation periods are of different length in the original data 
we standardized 'this time to the Ion gest period possible for all cases: each 
case is observed for 46 months after its initial entry into the program applic-
able. An assistance speIl has been defined as aperiod of uninterrupted 
Social Assistance receipt disregarding single month interruptions. 
We will compare median durations of such assistance speIls for different 
(sub)populations as weIl as their product-limit survivor functions. This 
function expresses the probability that a household remains in the state of 
Social Assistance recipiency until time t. The survivor function G( t) can be 
expressed as 
G(!) = P (I' > t) 
where T is the time when the event occurs by which the current episode 
ends. 
Furthermore, we will compare the transition rates of those (sub )popula-
tions, a central feature of the analysis of temporal patterns of claiming Social 
Assistance with event history techniques. In our case this rate describes the 
statistical risk of ending Social Assistance receipt or, in more precise words, 
the conditional propensity of leaving Social Assistance in a given time, 
21 Waivers are legally approved exemptions from federal roles made possible by the 1988 
Family Assistance Act. 
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assuming that there was no such termination up to the beginning of this 
interval. More formally, the rate between the state 0 (still receiving benefit) 
and state 1 (not receiving benefit) is defined as 
() 1. P(t ~ T < t' I T ~ t) r t = Im--------
1'-'#1 t' - t 
The transition rate indicates the risk of staying on Social Assistance. It may 
increase over time, meaning that the longer a household receives benefits, 
the more likely it becomes that it will terminate receipt shortly. For other 
households the risk may decrease over time: the longer they receive benefit, 
the more likely it is that they will remain benefit claimants. 
Results 
The basic dynamies of claiming Social Assistance are shown in Table 3 (see 
below). The"main result may be summarized as folIows: Families with lone 
or unemployed parents in California, who did not leave Social Assistance in 
their first year of receipt, stay longer and more constantly on the rolls than 
do their German counterparts. 
Table 3: Gross Durationa of Claiming Social Assistance 
Bremen Halle Alameda Los Angeles Total 
County County 
16 15 1 8 40 1- 2 years 
26.2 38.5 7.1 12.7 22.6 
10 9 2 7 8 
2 - 3 years 
16.4 23.1 14.3 11.1 15.8 
More than 35 15 11 48 109 
3 years 57.4 38.5 78.6 76.2 61.6 
Total 61 39 14 63 177 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Median 
in month 43 29 46 46 45 
Note: a Duration from the beginning of the first to the end of the last observed spell. 
Source: LSA and CWPDP, own calculations. 
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Nearly one third of the German households overcame their dependency per-
manently in their second year compared with only one tenth of all Cali-
fomian families. More than three quarters of the Califomians stay on the 
rolls for more than 3 years, but onIy about half of the German households 
did so. 
The median of the gross duration on Social Assistance amounts to 43 
months in Bremen and onIy 29 months in Halle,22 while less than half of the 
Califomian households under study overcame their dependency within the 
observation window of 46 month. 
Most Califomia households under study have one continuous spell of 
claiming social assistance. Thus, their net duration on Social Assistance, the 
cumulative time they spend on Social Assistance over all episodes minus all 
interruptions, is only insignificantly shorter than their gross duration, the 
total time from first receipt to the end of the last episode observed. WhiIe 
onIy 8 percent of California households have more than one speIl, one 
quarter of the Germans do. Thus 25 percent of the German claiming house-
holds leave Social Assistance but return within the observation period. As a 
Figure 2: Duration of SociaI Assistance Episodes in Germany and CaIifomia 
(product-limit survivor functions) 
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. . . . '. ......... gross 
...... .................. 
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.. "" .. 
first episode 
0.5 
----------
Germany first episode 
12 18 24 30 36 42 
Duration in Months 
Source: LSA and CWPDP. own calculations. 
22 If we exclude all cases, in which the claimant only 'waits' for social security benefits, 
the median rises to 37.5 months for Bremen and 30 months for HaUe. 
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consequence net duration is substantially shorter than gross duration in Ger-
many. The median net duration is 36 months for Bremen and 27 months for 
Halle, whereas the corresponding figure is 46 for Alameda as weIl as Los 
Angeles County. 
Figure 2 shows the product-limit survivor functions for Germany and 
Califomia, both, for gross duration as for the first episode only. The figure 
shows that as time goes by markedly fewer households stay on Social Assis-
tance in Germany compared with Califomia. The figure reveals also that 
there is only a small differenee between the overall duration and the duration 
of the initial episode in California, whereas the differenee is quite visible in 
Germany. 
How can we explain those differences? Do special soeio-demographic 
characteristics of the observed subpopulations and thus a eertain selectivity 
of the different welf are systems account for the differenees in Social Assist -
ance dynamics? 
There are no signifieant differences in how types of households (lone vs . 
. unemployed parent) ·are distributed among the four cities (cf. Table 4 be-
low). But there are differences in the homogeneity of the populations: the 
Californian population is more heterogeneous than the German one. 
In Alameda County the sampie spreads more or less equally over Afri-
can-, Mexican-, W4ite- and Asian-Americans (in this descending order). In 
Los Angeles County nearly two thirds of the observed group are of Mexi-
can-American origin. The Halle sampIe consists - apart from one case - of 
native Germans only, one third of the Bremen sampIe is of foreign origin. 
The latter consist more often of a eouple with an unemployed parent. The 
same is true for Mexican-Americans in Califomia. 
With respect to the number of children per household there are stronger 
inter-country than intra-city similarities: Bremen is more similar to Alameda 
County than to Halle and Halle is more similar to Los Angeles County than 
to Bremen. The youngest child in the household is oldest in Halle (median 
of 3 years and a mean age of 3.4 years) and youngest in Los Angeles County 
(median of 1 year and a mean age of 3.5 years). Just because of this demo-
graphie difference it should be easier for households in Halle than in Los 
Angeles to stop elaiming Soeial Assistance.23 
23 This demographie differenee seems still eonsistent with the results of Dunean & Voges 
(1993) based on 1983-86 data. 80% of their PSID sampie had a ehild under the age of 4 
in the household, whereas this held for only one third of the Bremen sampie. 
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Table 4: Household Characteristics in the Initial Month of Receipt 
Bremen Halle Alameda Los Angeles 
County County 
Type 0/ household 
lone (pregnant) parent 78.7% 79.5% 92.9% 71.9% 
couple with child(ren) 19.7 15.4 7.1 21.9 
others 1.6 5.1 0.0 6.2 
Nationallethnic background 
German 65.6 97.4 
Eastem-Europe 18.0 
Non-European 13.1 
African-American 7.6 12.5 
Mexican-American 23.1 65.6 
Asian-American 38.5 7.8 
White-American 30.8 12.5 
others 3.3 2.6 0.0 1.6 
Number 0/ children 
upto 1 68.9 35.9 61.5 43.8 
2 21.3 30.8 30.8 29.7 
3 or more 9.8 33.3 7~7 26.5 
Age 0/ youngest child 
less than one year 29.6 25.7 38.5 45.4 
1- 2 years 14.8 7.7 7.7 6.2 
2- 3 years 8.2 7.7 0.0 3.1 
3 - 6 years 18.0 35.9 46.1 21.9 
6 - 16 years 24.6 23.0 7.7 23.4 
16 - 18 years 4.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Immigration status 
resident citizen 49.2 97.4 more 42.4 
immigrant of German origin 27.9 0.0 than 2/3 0.0 
legaJized foreigner 14.8 2.6 missings 32.2 
not IegaJized foreigner/parolee 8.2 0.0 25.4 
Qualificational status 
in school or training 7.3 7.7 15.4 14.8 
no traininglhigh school degree 29.1 7.7 46.2 54.1 
completed traininglhigh school 52.7 84.6 38.4 29.5 
college degree 10.9 0.0 0.0 1.6 
Employment status 
full-time 0.0 21.1 23.0 9.8 
part-time or casual 4.9 0.0 0.0 11.8 
unemployed 44.2 55.3 30.8 29.4 
out of labor force (family) 36.1 18.4 23.1 23.5 
out of labor force (other) 14.8 5.3 23.1 25.5 
Source: LSA and CWPDP, own calculations. 
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While in California every household included a child under 14, eight per-
cent of the German households did not. Since becoming 18 is the age limit 
for Social Assistance eligibility German households claiming these benefits 
will loose one eligible member within the observation window of 46 
months: this shrinking of the household decreases the amount of benefits 
owed and may end eligibility of the household for Social Assistance 
alltogether. Nearly half of the population observed are resident citizens in 
Bremen and in Los Angeles County. In Halle this is true for almost every-
body in the sampie. 
The two countries differ in the qualification of the head of household. 
More than 60 percent of the Bremen and more than 80 percent of the Halle 
adults completed at least a high school degree (10 percent in Bremen even 
hold a college degree). In LOs Angeles and Alameda County this holds only 
for 30 to 40 percent of the households. None of the unqualified claimants 
could end their receipt in the 46 months observation period in either country 
- except one case in Halle. 
Another obvious difference concerns the employment status of the head 
of household. Only five percent of the Bremen parents are part-time or casu-
ally employed. More·than 20 percent ofthe California adults are employees, 
most of them full-time. The same is true for Halle. Here the general wage 
level was about 30 percent lower than in West Germany. Mainly due to the 
small case numbers there is no significant correlation between employment 
status and educational qualification in any of the cities. 
Nearly all Californians, who stopped claiming Social Assistance, in-
creased their earnings or found a job. The same was true for only 35 percent 
of German claimants. In Bremen 15 percent and even 45 percent in Halle 
left to move on to social security programs.24 There is a validity problem re-
garding this variable though, since we lack information in 40 percent of the 
German and 20 percent of the Califomia cases. 
We summarize our description by stressing four findings: Californians do 
receive Social Assistance benefits longer and more continuously than Ger-
mans. Partly this may be explained by demographie differences in the age of 
the youngest household member: Children receiving Social Assistance in 
Califomia are on average younger than in Germany , which tends to prolong 
dependency speIls. But more can be explained by two other factors: firstly, 
the qualification of the head of household is much better in Germany than in 
24 Five wornen left Social Assistance to live with a new partner, four in Bremen and one in 
L.A. 
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Califomia; secondly, the employment status of the main breadwinner is 
different: many more Californians already participate in the work force even 
full-time while claiming Social Assistance; thus Califomians cannot over-
come dependency by getting a job or by increasing their earned income sub-
stantially. 
Let us now focus on the different time effects of Social Assistance receipt 
in both countries and the effects of some possible covariates. 
Corresponding to the different survivor functions of the two national 
sampies (see p. 20) the transition rate for the German sampie is much higher 
during the whole time periode Furthermore, we discover a typical time effect 
for both countries (see Figure 3).25 
Figure 3: Transitions out of SociaI Assistance 
(piecewise constant exponentiaI rates for the initial episode) 
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Source: LSA and CWPDP, own calculations. 
In Germany the rate drops after the second year of Social Assistance receipt 
approximately by one third and rises in the fourth year again reaching nearly 
four fifths of the rate in the second year. In California the rate increases con-
stantly: It builds up from the lowest level in the second year (with no events 
in the first half of it), increases 4.4 times by the third year and another 19 
percent in the fourth year. This means for Califomians though on a very low 
level: the longer people stay on Social Assistance the more likely it is that 
they will leave. The tendency in Germany is antithetical: those who leave, 
depart rather early. 
25 These results hold whether we choose a six or twelve month time period interval within 
a pice-wise constant exponential modeling approach. To limit the number of covariates, 
we can therefore rely on a twelve month interval for further modeling. 
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Table 5: Transitions out of Social Assistance (initial episode) 
Variables Germany Califomia 
Time on Sodal Assistance 
0-1 year -16.61 -18.55 
1 - 2 years -3.68'" -6.75"· 
2 - 3 years -3.84··· -5.23·" 
more than 3 years -3.43··· -4.98··· 
Location 
BremenlL.A. County 
Halle! Alameda County 0.51* 0.91*·· 
Ethnic background 
White-American 
African-American 1.28·· 
Asian-American -0.71 
Mexican-American 0.60 
Employment status 
Unemployed 
Full-time employed -0.31 
Part-time employed 1.90··· 
Casualy employed 0.89 
Out of the Iabour force: 
- family reasons -0.87··· 
- in training 0.58· 
- other reasons -1.57·· 
Cause of claim 
Pregnancy!child birth 
Insufficient benefits 0.81 
Separation 1.09··· 
Unemployment 0.47 
Immigration 0.99·· 
Other causes 0.29 
Number of all episodes 67 190 
Episodes with transition 49 43 
Notes: Piecewise constant exponential model for the rate of transitions based on a 
balanced sampIe (listwise elimination of missing data). *** significant at the .01 level, 
** significant at the .05 level, * significant at the .10 level. 
Source: LSA and CWPDP, own caIculations. 
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As the last step of our analysis we ask: Do possible covariates influence 
the transition rates and if so, how do they do it? Table 5 shows that the time 
effects we found remain significant in the muIti-variate model. 
Regional disparities are significant for both countries, though in Germany 
at a rather low level. In Germany the probability to stop claiming Social As-
sistance is two thirds higher for citizens of Halle compared to those of Bre-
men. In Alameda County it is 1.5 times higher than in Los Angeles County. 
Claimants of Black-American origin are two and a half times more likely 
to leave Social Assistance than White-Americans (5 of 9 black households 
leave Social Assistance within 46 month; their median duration of claiming 
Social Assistance amounts to 43 months). Asian- and Mexican-Americans 
do not differ significantly from the white population. 
In Germany persons who are part-time employed leave Social Assistance 
more easily than the unemployed. Compared to the laUer it is even harder to 
leave for those, who are out of the labor force for family or other reasons. 
For those being out of the labor force due to family obligations the transition 
rate to non,...receipt is 58 percent lower than the rate for unemployed claim-
ants. 
Furthermore it iseasier to leave Social Assistance for those persons in 
Germany who became dependent due to aseparation or immigration than 
for those who had to apply for Social Assistance due to a pregnancy or the 
birth of a child. Separated women leave Social Assistance nearly two tirnes 
faster than do recent mothers, though there is no single effect of the age of 
the youngest child in the household. More than one third of the claimants 
who entered Social Assistance due to immigration leave it by increasing 
their income or finding a (new) job.26 
To test our complex time-dependent model we calculate a conventional 
binary logistic regression for the probability to stop claiming Social 
Assistance at all within the standardized observation window of 46 moths 
(see Table 6). 
26 The following variables were not significant in both countries: 'type of household', "age 
of head of household', 'number of children in the household', "age of youngest child' 
and 'kind of training'. The 'national background' (German, legal immigrant, foreigner, 
refugee) was insignificant for the German and all others including the 'control vs. ex-
perimental status' for the California sampIe. 
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Table 6: Conditioning Factors for Leaving Social Assistance within 
46 Months after the First Entry 
Variables Germany Califomia 
Intercept -1.38"· -3.15··· 
Location 
BremenlL.A. County 
Halle! Alameda County 1.37" 
Kind of training 
Completed or in training 
No training -0.96" 
Ethnic background 
White-American 
African-American 1.86·· 
Asian-American 0.28 
Mexican-American 0.45 
Cause of claim 
Pregnancy!child birth . 
Insufficient benefits 0.47 
Separation 1.74'" 1.27 
Unemployment 2.17··· 1.83· 
Immigration 2.69·" 0.70 
Other causes 2.75"· -12.51 
Number of all episodes 67 190 
Episodes with transition 49 43 
Notes: Binary logistic regression based on a balanced sampie (listwise elimination of 
missing data). *** significant at the .01 level. ** significant at the .05 level. * signifi-
cant at the .10 level. 
Source: LSA and CWPDP. own calculations. 
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This less sophisticated but more robust model shows a stronger regional 
effect for Germany but none for Califomia. Furthermore, it shows a compa-
rable effect of ethnic background for California and an educational effect for 
Germany . In Germany it is significantly less probable that someone leaves 
Social Assistance without completed training than with a degree or being in 
training. There are no effects of employment status for both countries, but 
there is a slightly notable (positive) effect of unemployment as a cause of 
claiming Social Assistance.27 
27 The following variables were not significant in both countries: 'type of household', 'age 
of head of household', 'number of children in the household', 'age of youngest child' 
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Discussion 
What explains the differenees in the dynamies of family poverty in Germany 
and Califomia? Three faetors eome to mind: differenees in national labor 
markets, divergent program selectivity and the non-universal design of the 
American welfare system (where leaving Social Assistanee may involve 
disadvantages like the loss of health insurance). 
Coneeming loeal labor markets we do not find higher unemployment 
rates in California as we would expeet them knowing that Social Assistanee 
spells are Ion ger in the two observed eounties. Aeeording to Table 7 the 
unemployment rates were significantly higher in the two German eities than 
in the Calfornian eounties. In Germany unemployment rates fell from the 
seeond to the third year of observation, though, while they rose slightly in 
California, but deereased even more signifieantly from the third to the fourth 
year. This might explain the small inerease in the Californian transition rate 
in the last year of observation. 
Table 7: Unemployment Rates in Germany and Califomia in Percent 
Germany California 
Year nation .. state- Alameda Los Angeles 
wide Bremen Halle wide County County 
1989 7.9a (1) 14.1 
1990 7.2a (2) 13.1 
1991 7.3 (3) 10.0 (1) 9.7 7.7 (1) 5.3 (1) 8.2 
1992 8.5 (4) 10.0 (2) 13.3 9.1 (2) 6.5 (2) 9.6 
1993 9.8 (3) 13.7 9.4 (3) 6.6 (3) 9.8 
1994 10.6 (4) 13.5 8.6 (4) 6.1 (4) 9.4 
Notes: Consecutive year of observation in brackets; a 'old states' only. 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt; California Statistical Abstracts. 
The German labor market generally suffered from high unemployment even 
before unifieation. The U.S. labor market, on the other hand, was eharaeter-
ized by rather low offieial unemployment rates and new jobs were ereated in 
massive amounts mostly in the service seetor. Weaker institutional restric-
tions goveming the employment contraet in the U.S. (eoncerning the level of 
minimum wages and protection against dismissal), though, have led to a 
rising number of low-skilled, low-wage and insecure jobs. Thus, poor par-
and 'employment status'. So was the 'national background' (German, legal immigrant, 
foreigner, refugee) for the German and all others including the 'control vs. experimental 
status' for the Californian sampie. 
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ents are placed in different employment landscapes in each country. Both 
countries share the conflict between family obligations and employment 
demands. Germans face a severe problem of unemployment, Califomians 
find employment more easily, but such success will often involve marginal, 
unstable and low-wage jobs with minimal benefits, i.e. remaining among the 
'working poor' . 
Table 8 shows such different income dynamics for Germany and the 
D.S.: Germans stay unemployed longer than Americans. But if they find 
work, Germans scatter across several segments of income distribution: only 
6.3 percent in the West and 4.4 percent in the East transit from unemploy-
ment to a low wage job. In contrast, D.S. exits from unemployment are 
mainly focussed on the working poor: 43.9 percent change from unemploy-
ment to the lowest income category and, comparatively speaking, barely 
reach higher categories.28 Thus, if one finds a job it is easier to end Social 
Assistance dependency and to escape poverty through employment in 
Germany than it is in the U.S. 
Table 8: Transitions out ofUnemployment and Low Wage Jobs, 1991 to 1992 
Destination 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(un- (low 
_ income brackets a _ Origin empl.) wage) 
West unemployed 61.5 6.3 5.1 8.2 12.4 2.5 3.8 
Germany low wage 5.8 61.8 11.1 3.6 9.1 4.6 3.9 
East unemployed 54.6 4.4 9.3 18.0 5.9 3.3 4.4 
Germany low wage 32.0 28.0 22.9 12.9 2.4 0.0 1.8 
USAb 
unemployed 29.0 43.9 14.0 7.4 3.4 2.2 0.1 
low wage 8.3 67.8 16.8 3.7 2.0 0.9 0.7 
a 
Notes: Income brackets are based on relative income positions (RIP), defined as the ratio 
of absolute individual income and the population mean per year. Bracket 1 is set as 0 or 'no 
income', bracket 2 as RIP <f, .05. All other brackets ascend from 0.5 in steps of .25 to 
bracket 7 for any RIP ~ 1.5; 1990 to 1991. 
Source: GSOEP, PSID; calculations by Holger FABIG (1999a). 
28 This effect dominates in a one-year and in a two-year perspective (FABIG 1999a,b). 
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'Education barriers' in labor markets are also quite different since train-
ing on the job (V.S.) sucks in unqualified work more easily than does a 
labor market which relies on externally acquired standard certification of 
average qualifications (Germany ). This contrast is likely to strongly affect 
'poverty landscapes ' and might explain as weIl, why we only found a nega-
tive effect of not being (formaIly) trained in Germany. 
Education in Germany is highly institutionalized for all groups of the 
population. Thus, lower class Germans are generally better educated than 
their Califomian counterparts. "Some 80 percent of German youth attain 
either a vocational training certificate or a university degree, and 19 of the 
remaining 20 percent receive some type of formal post-secondary education 
or training. By contrast, around 31 percent of V.S. schoolleavers receive no 
other formal training or education after leaving school, and 46 percent gain 
neither a certificate nor a degree" (NICKELL 1998: 316).29 
Another effect of labor market differences is that low income families in 
Germany may still save money, since the employed generally enjoy higher 
standards of income, while this is usually impossible for low income fami-
lies in Califomia. If a sudden loss of income occurs, Germans regularly dis-
_pose of some assets which buffer them vis-a-vis dependency or may even 
allow them to avoid dependency alltogether. This option of temporal self-
reliance cannot be developed in a society which relies in parts on a low 
wage economy and where low wages are consistently below the poverty 
line. This might also explain why - at the first time of entry into Social 
Assistance - the youngest child in German households is significantly older 
than it is in Californian families. As a result Californian families start earlier 
into and therefore stay longer on Social Assistance as they never knew 
"years of plenty" in which they could accumulate some resources. 
The differences in the observed patterns of Social Assistance receipt 
could also be explained by selection effects: Other people may 'end up' on 
Social Assistance in each country. In Germany a mostly compulsory un-
employment insurance system is at work (with broader coverage, higher 
replacement rates, and longer benefit duration than in the D.S.; see SCHMID 
et al. 1992); also, as mentioned above, there is a relatively generous and 
extensive child benefit system. Therefore, the people supported by the 'last 
net' are the less qualified, the less motivated and the less successful in the 
German labor market. Such a strong 'negative selection' should not obtain 
in Califomia, since the welfare state in general did not absorb so many risks 
29 See also NICKELL 1996 and NICKELLILAYARD 1998. 
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beforehand. But, this hypothesis is not supported by our empirical findings. 
Rather, it seems to be the other way around: The better the general welfare 
state, the more risks it absorbs, the better those people perform who are not 
protected by the system and have to rely on Social Assistance. The rising 
welf are state tide seems to lift all boats alike, be they yachts or row boats - a 
finding, which is in stark contrast to neoliberal expectations and the V.S. 
experience. 
Finally, a major reason for the more continuous Social Assistance receipt 
of Califomians may be the loss of Medicaid benefits when one leaves 
AFDC. Even though the 1988 welfare reform did allow AFDC claimants 
who took up work to continue receiving subsidized child care and Medicaid 
for one year (Transitional Medicaid Assistance, TMA)30, the general cou-
pling of receiving cash aid and Medicaid eligibility still functions as a work 
disincentive in the American system. Since German health insurance is de 
facto universal, we do not find similar disincentives or 'notches' there. As a 
result claiming Social Assistance is more frequently interrupted in Germany 
since leaving Social Assistance involves no tisk but rather grants a· chance. 
Such interruptions do not only decrease net durations and public spending in 
Germany compared .with the V.S. These interruptions also demonstrate: 
Exits are possible and more likely in a non-punitive system - even if low 
income parents are. not driven into the labor market by inadequate state 
benefits or time limits and even if health services are adaequate for every-
body. Thus the German system seems to be at odds with neoliberal expecta-
tions: Overall a generous welfare state does not necessarily decrease work 
effort, especially if at the same time capabilities are cultivated universally in 
the education and labor market system. 
Conclusion 
The dynamics of family poverty varies according to how heterogeneous 
welf are programs and claimants are. These dynamics cannot be understood 
without paying attention to the central role of parental employment and 
welfare state benefits. Full-time employment of two parents outside the low-
wage sector could reduce poverty significantly. Thus we need (a) average 
qualifications and access to normal jobs for (b) two parents in a family to 
have arealladder out of poverty. Both requirements have become more and 
more unlikely in modem societies. On the one hand good jobs with exten-
sive benefits often require post-high school education, and family formation 
30 This streching of Medicaid was continued by the new TANF program in 1996. 
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is postponed until a person's occupational career is weIl underway. On the 
other hand the number of young single parents is continuously rising in the 
V.S. and in Europe. The increase in family poverty thus is not due to lazy 
underclass parents, but to substantial changes in economy and demography. 
This increase does not signify personal flaws of the poor but is a product of 
more general societal malaises. Social policy and welfare society are chal-
Ienged and structural reforms are called for, if poverty of families is to be 
contained in Germany and the V.S. 
First, the state should recognize the contribution which rearing a child 
makes to society by granting adequate, cost -covering support. B ut one could 
also think of a "generic model of antipoverty policy for children" (cf. SMEE-
DINGIDANZINGERIRAINW ATER 1997). It would begin with increasing child 
allowances in whatever form: family allowances, refundable tax credits, and 
other types of subsidies. Also workplace flexibility needs more support, for 
example through employment policy, parental leave for caring for sick 
children, availability of affordable child care and so on. Finally, conditions 
of work and minimum wages in the low-income sec tor need to be improyed 
considerably. 
Even though theD.S. is characterized by relatively low unemployment 
rates, it has the highest child poverty rate among OECD economies. We ob-
served less dynamics in longer-term Social Assistance receipt of families 
with children and thus longer net durations of dependency and longer 
stretches of public payments in the D.S. Higher spending for general social 
security in Germany seems to pay off in the short, middle and long mn. 
Such spending levels do not only reduce poverty but also diminish the 
general need for extended welfare payments. 
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Appendix 
Sources of Information for the California County Cases 
The LSA contains detailed information on different aspects of the claimants' 
situation taken from administrative data. It provides information on demo-
graphie indicators, the claiming unit, its housing context and employment 
situation at the beginning of each Social Assistance speIl. In the CWPDP 
files, however, administrative information is much more sparse and basi-
cally restricted to demographics. Information on other aspects of the claim-
ants' living conditions has been collected from an accompanying extensive, 
two-wave panel survey. 
For our analysis we gathered aIl the information present in the LSA from 
the CWPDP study, making use ofboth CWPDP's administrative and survey 
data. In combining both information sourees, priority was given to the con-
tent of administrative records, especially regarding information on dates. We 
had to rely on survey data regarding most aspects of living conditions and 
employment situations. With respect to demographie information, both 
sources were used to check and validate the information contained in our 
dataset. 
From both sources of information, a comparative description of Social 
Assistance careers, speIls and their duration could be assembled. In the LSA 
files, covarüites refer to the Social Assistance claimant at the beginning of 
each Social Assistance speIl. We imposed the same structure on the CWPDP 
data. This transformation led to a identical time-dependent measurement of 
relevant variables within the administrative CWPDP data. The CWPDP 
panel surveys, however, were conducted at fixed points in time in 1993/94 
and 1995/96, independent of the claimants' AFDC state. As no survey could 
be carried out at the point of Social Assistance entry, it is impossible to pro-
vide measurement of CWPDP covariates at the very beginning of a Social 
Assistance speIl - except in very rare circumstances. The information of the 
CWPDP surveys has to be attributed to different Social Assistance speIls, 
thus introducing assumptions about the stability of the respondent's situation 
and characteristics. 
In general, the different concepts measured in the CWPDP survey were 
treated according to three broad strategies: Firstly, we conceived the ma-
jority of covariate variables as fairly stable characteristics where an attribu-
tion is feasible even over a longer time periode Under this heading fell con-
cepts like qualification background and household composition. Secondly, 
we regarded variables like employment status as specific to the time of the 
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survey interview, which we did not attribute across poverty episodes. 
Finally, there are some directly time-dependent variables -like age of head 
of household or age of youngest child and the number of children - which 
we corrected and dated back to the situation pertaining at Social Assistance 
entry in the individual speIl. 
Attribution rules used with CWPDP survey data 
Survey interview location Attribution rule adopted 
Ongoing welfare speIl Direct attribution 
After leaving welf are Backwarding information 
Before beginning new speIl Forwarding information 
Attributed information 
All available; correction for direct 
time-related information 
A vailable except from employment 
status; correction for direct time-
related information 
A vailable except from employment 
status; correction for direct time-
related information 
